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Abstract 
We investigate a novel approach to reduce measurement error in subjective well-being (SWB) 
data. Using a between-subject design, half of the subjects are asked to promise to answer the 
survey questions truthfully in an attempt to make them commit to truth-telling. This allows us 
to experimentally test whether making a promise affects their responses. We find a 
statistically significant difference between mean stated well-being between the two groups 
(with and without a promise, although the effect sizes are rather small). We then investigate to 
what extent the differences in stated well-being also affect the inference from regressions 
models on the determinants of SWB. We find important differences in terms of size and 
statistical significance of the coefficients between the two models, despite the small effect 
sizes on the dependent stated well-being variable.  
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1. Introduction 
We have witnessed an increased use of subjective well-being (SWB) measures in economics; 
from 2000 to 2006, 157 papers and numerous books on the topic were published in the 
economics literature (Krueger and Schkade, 2008). While most economists would probably 
agree that the information gained from subjective questions is interesting and important, the 
unwillingness to rely on such questions has historically marked an important difference 
between economists and other social scientists (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). This 
attitude may, however, have shifted among economists during the last ten years. Furthermore, 
we have seen an increased interest in incorporating findings from other disciplines, such as 
psychology, into economics (see, e.g., Layard, 2006). One of the problems with SWB data is 
that it is prone to social desirability bias, i.e., the tendency of survey respondents to answer 
questions in a manner that will be viewed favorably by others and in line with certain social 
norms (Phillips and Clancy, 1972). Such social-image concerns are likely to be important to 
many people (Lacetera and Macis, 2010). Although not as extensively explored, it is also 
plausible that self-image concerns can bias survey responses, e.g., in an SWB context 
respondents may not want to admit even to themselves that they are unsatisfied with their life 
or some aspects thereof. These types of misreportings create a measurement error in the 
reported data, which can be handled either at the modeling stage1, the data collection stage, or 
both.  
In this paper we investigate a novel approach to reduce measurement error in SWB 
surveys. We test a self-commitment mechanism where survey respondents are asked to 
promise to answer the survey questions truthfully. The main objective is to experimentally 
test whether making a promise affects responses to survey questions, in particular subjective 
well-being questions. Subsequently, if we find differences, we investigate to what extent these 
differences affect the inference drawn from regressions models on the determinants of SWB. 
Traditionally, economists have been skeptical to asking respondents to tell the truth, 
primarily because there are no actual incentives for responding truthfully. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that a promise alone can indeed induce an emotional commitment to fulfill 
the promise (Braver, 1995; Ostrom et al., 1992; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; Vanberg 
2008; Carlsson et al. 2013; Kataria and Winter, 2013; Jacquemet et al., 2013). 2 This approach 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, e.g., Hausman (2001) for a review. The mismeasurement problem for linear models in econometrics is 
usually solved by using instrumental variables (Hausman, 2001). Abrevaya and Hausman (1999) offer methods 
that also deal with binary choice with misclassification and mismeasured discrete dependent variables with 
several categories.   
2 The reason why it works has recently been under scientific scrutiny. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) found 
experimental evidence that a promise works because of guilt aversion: A guilt-averse person does not want to let 
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has been applied in, among other areas, experiments (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004; 
Jacquemet et al., 2013) and stated preference surveys on environmental problems (Carlsson et 
al., 2013). Yet as far as we know, it has not been used in subjective well-being surveys.  
The literature on how to reduce measurement error at the data collection stage is rather 
extensive. One such area is survey research dealing with particularly sensitive topics such as 
racism, terrorism, corruption, illegal behavior, and drug use. Methods such as randomized 
response (Warner 1965; Greenberg 1969) and item count techniques (Raghavarao and 
Federer, 1979) have been used in surveys with sensitive questions. Using randomized 
response, the respondent flips a coin and is instructed to answer either a sensitive or a non-
sensitive yes/no question based on the outcome of the coin flip. Only the respondent knows 
which question he or she answered. This procedure hides individual answers but enables 
analysts to assess the true population proportions of yes/no replies because the noise 
probability is known. The drawback of the randomized response method is that it draws 
attention to the act of measurement itself. Respondents can become suspicious of intent and 
claims to anonymity and focus too much on how the method works instead of answering the 
questions. The item count method randomly splits the sample into two groups: control and 
treatment group. Both groups are asked insensitive questions, and then the treatment group is 
also asked a sensitive question, i.e. the question of interest. The respondents are then asked to 
reveal the number of "yes" answers they have given. Respondent anonymity is assured 
whereas the number of people who answered "yes" to the sensitive question can be 
mathematically deduced. While the item count method is straightforward with a low level of 
burden on the respondents, one major drawback of the method is the lack of power of the 
estimator for relatively high sample sizes (Droitcour, 1991).  
SWB data utilizes what in economics is known as experience utility, which is 
distinguished from what is known as decision utility. While decision utility is inferred from 
the decision maker’s observed choices, experience utility is the satisfaction we experience 
once the decision is made. If the choices are revealed in a market, the data is known as 
revealed preference data while stated preference data represents choices made or stated in a 
constructed survey situation. Stated preference data is used frequently in economics to value 
public goods. Interestingly, both SWB data and stated-preference studies deal with the same 
difficulties common to data based on subjective assessments. A number of approaches to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
down others’ expectations and is therefore committed to the promises made. An alternative explanation is that 
people may have a taste for keeping their word (e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004). Using a novel design, 
Vanberg (2008) found support for the latter explanation, i.e., people have preferences for promise keeping per se. 
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reduce the so-called hypothetical bias, i.e., the difference between stated behavior and 
behavior if the choice situation would have been an actual one, have been suggested in the 
stated preference literature. One common approach is to use a cheap talk script, which aims to 
reduce hypothetical bias by informing respondents about the occurrence of hypothetical bias 
(Cummings and Taylor, 1999). The idea is that by making respondents aware of the problem, 
they will exert more effort when responding and in that way hypothetical bias will be reduced. 
The empirical support for a cheap talk script is mixed, and it is clear that the effect depends 
both on the context and on the formulation of the script (see, e.g., Aadland and Caplan, 2006; 
Carlsson et al., 2005; List, 2001). Another approach that has been used is so-called inferred 
valuation (Carlsson et al., 2010; Lusk and Norwood, 2009a,b), where respondents estimate 
other people’s valuations of goods. 3  Compared with the stated preference literature, 
surprisingly little attention has been given to reduce measurement error in SWB surveys. 
Layard (2006) argues that there is a need for an expanded model of happiness that 
incorporates findings from other disciplines, such as psychology. While his main focus was 
on theory, there is without doubt also a need to develop the measurement methods of SWB 
data, and as discussed, it seems possible to incorporate findings from neighboring disciplines 
in the SWB literature.  
Understanding what affects subjective well-being is important as it could help economists 
design policies that improve people’s wellbeing. In the late 1990s, economists started to 
present large-scale empirical analyses of determinants of well-being (Frey and Stutzer, 2002). 
Evidence suggests that poor health, divorce, unemployment, and lack of social relationships 
are important determinants of well-being (Dolan et al., 2008). While economists usually focus 
on determinants of SWB that can be categorized as actual observable life experiences, the 
approach has been somewhat more pluralistic in psychology. Here, the overall well-being is 
complemented with reported well-being in major domains of life, such as health, finances, 
social relationships, and sex life. The advantage of this life domain approach is that it better 
reflects subjective factors such as personal aspirations and norms that could affect the overall 
well-being. For example, an individual with high income and high financial aspirations could 
be less satisfied with life than someone with low income and low financial aspirations. In this 
paper we apply both approaches, i.e. both the determinants of overall and domain-specific 
SWB. Since social desirability and self-image bias is most likely a problem for value-laden 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Other approaches to reduce hypothetical bias in the stated preference literature include ex-post calibration of 
willingness-to-pay estimates based on follow-up questions (e.g., Champ et al., 1997; Champ and Bishop, 2001; 
Johannesson et al., 1999) and the time-to-think protocol (Cook et al., 2007; Whittington et al., 1992). 
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questions, it is of interest to investigate the potential effect of measurement errors both in a 
setting with only a measurement error in the dependent variable and in a setting with 
measurement errors in both the dependent and some independent variables. 
 
2. Social desirability and self-image in a measurement-error framework  
One of the problems with SWB data is that it is prone to social desirability bias, i.e., the 
tendency of survey respondents to answer questions in a manner that will be viewed favorably 
by others and in line with some social norm (Phillips and Clancy, 1972). Self-image concerns 
may also bias the survey responses, e.g., respondents do not want to admit even to themselves 
that they are not satisfied with their life.  
In order to illustrate the potential problem with social desirability and self-image 
concerns, we use a measurement-error framework where the dependent and/or the 
independent variables in a regression model are observed with an error. The simplest case is a 
linear regression model with one independent variable and no intercept, which is also the 
standard textbook case (see, e.g., Greene, 2002). The observed dependent variable, 𝑦, is 
specified as 𝑦 = 𝑦∗ + 𝑢, where 𝑦∗ is the true variable and u is a normally distributed error 
term, i.e., 𝑢~𝑁(𝜇! ,𝜎!!). Suppose that the observed independent variable is 𝑥, i.e. 𝑥 = 𝑥∗ +𝑣, where 𝑥∗ is the true variable and 𝑣~𝑁(𝜇! ,𝜎!). Assume that 𝑢 and 𝑣 are independently 
distributed. If 𝜇 = 0 the error term is a random error, and if 𝜇 ≠ 0 the error is a systematic 
error. Two results are well-known in the literature. First, assuming that only 𝑦 is measured 
with a random error does not result in biased parameter estimates since the measurement error 
is incorporated in the disturbance term. It will, however, increase the standard error of the 
estimated parameter, i.e., the parameter will be estimated with less precision. Second, if 
instead 𝑥 is measured with a random error, the parameter estimates are inconsistent and 
biased towards zero (attenuation bias). Hausman (2001) calls this the “iron law of 
econometrics” – the magnitude of the estimate is usually smaller than expected. If both the 
dependent and the independent variable are mismeasured, the parameters are still – of course 
– biased and measured with less accuracy. The regression models used in the SWB literature 
deviate in many aspects from the simplifying assumptions made above. First of all, a multiple 
regression framework, with an intercept, is used in the litterature. Second, if social desirability 
and self-image are the reasons for measurement error, we would expect the dependent 
variable to be measured with a systematic rather than a random error. This is also true for 
independent variables with value-laden content such as life satisfaction in different domains, 
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but perhaps not for objective variables that are merely counts of various types of individual 
characteristics. With objective variables we expect the problem of measurement error to be 
less severe, and if present we would expect it to be a random error. Also note that the 
measurement errors of the independent variables might be correlated with each other and the 
measurement error of the dependent variable. Third, the dependent variable is measured on an 
ordinal scale and should therefore be estimated with a non-linear model such as an ordered 
probit model. Hausman et al. (1998) showed that misclassification4 of the dependent discrete 
variable causes inconsistent coefficient estimates if the measurement error is not taken into 
consideration in a standard framework (e.g., probit or logit). Relatively small amounts of 
misclassification of the dependent variable can lead to a large bias even with a large sample 
size. Hence, measurement bias causes severe problems. Exactly how these problems will 
manifest in our application is an empirical question. We will address the issue of 
measurement error in SWB data experimentally by comparing stated levels of well-being and 
coefficients of regressions models from two different survey versions, where only one of the 
versions include a short script and question asking if the respondents can answer the questions 
in the survey truthfully or not. 
 
3. Survey design 
The questions used in the present paper were administered to respondents as part of the 
thirteenth wave of the Citizen Panel (Martinsson et al., 2014). The Citizen Panel is an online 
panel survey administered by the Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE), which was 
established in 2010 by the Multidisciplinary Opinion and Democracy (MOD) research group 
at the Faculty of Social Science, University of Gothenburg in Sweden. The survey was carried 
out from November 27 to December 21 in 2014, and consisted of a set of core questions that 
were combined with some specific questions for the purpose of this study asked at the end of 
the survey. The Citizen Panel consists mainly of self-recruited respondents (85 percent). The 
remaining respondents (15 percent) is a probability-based recruitment from population 
samples. Overall, we consider the data to be of sufficient quality for the purpose of this paper. 
However, there are of course reasons to be cautious, especially when looking beyond the 
differences between the two treatments in an attempt to interpret what affects subjective well-
being. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Misclassification means that the response is reported or recorded in the wrong category.   
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The main feature of the experiment was that, based on random allocation, the subjects 
received either a survey version asking them to promise to tell the truth or a version without 
such a request. In all other respects, the two survey versions were identical.  
Immediately after the request to promise to tell the truth, the survey consisted of 
questions about overall and domain-specific stated well-being. More specifically, the 
respondents were asked how satisfied they felt overall with their life, and subsequently with 
various aspects of their life on a scale from 0 to 10. Finally they were asked questions about 
social trust, social interaction, health status, and socio-economic characteristics. 
 
4. Results 
 
5.1. Descriptive results  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the responses to the general and domain-specific 
well-being questions. The last columns report a test of the difference between the mean values 
with and without a promise, as well as the effect size. 
 
Table 1. Overall and domain-specific stated well-being, descriptive statistics, and test of 
difference between No Promise and Promise 
 No promise Promise Difference Effect size 
 Mean St.Dev. Obs. Mean St.Dev. Obs. Mean P-value Cohen's d 
Overall 6.94 1.99 1,782 6.58 2.10 1,700 0.36 0.000 0.176 
          
Financial situation 6.06 2.53 1,777 5.92 2.61 1,699 0.14 0.057 0.056 
Spare time 6.55 2.15 1,761 6.25 2.22 1,688 0.30 0.000 0.140 
Work 6.12 2.55 1,506 5.97 2.64 1,427 0.15 0.064 0.034 
Social life 6.88 2.18 1,769 6.52 2.25 1,695 0.36 0.000 0.164 
Sex life 5.30 2.94 1,648 4.83 2.99 1,629 0.47 0.000 0.188 
Family life 7.13 2.37 1,669 6.95 2.43 1,610 0.18 0.016 0.078 
Relationships 7.35 2.59 1,401 7.05 2.73 1,335 0.30 0.003 0.076 
Health 6.27 2.61 1,769 6.08 2.61 1,698 0.19 0.027 0.075 
* All variables range from 0 to 10.  
As discussed, the expected effect of the promise treatment is a reduction in stated well-being. 
This is confirmed for all nine well-being measures. Moreover, using a one-sided t-test we find 
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that the differences are statistically significant at a 5 percent significance level apart from 
financial situation and work, which are significant at a 10 percent level. The difference in 
mean values is largest for the sex life domain. The largest effect size is found for the overall 
well-being measure, with a Cohen’s d of 0.18. Consequently, although there is a robust effect 
of the promise treatment, the effect sizes are rather small.5 However, as discussed above, a 
relatively small amount of misclassification of a discrete dependent variable can still lead to 
biased coefficient estimates in the regression analysis (Hausman et al., 1998). 
We also report descriptive statistics of the variables that will be used in the regression 
models. These include both objective variables that we do not expect to be affected by the 
promise treatment, and a set of more value-laden questions such as self-reported health. The 
variables are presented in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Potential determinants of stated well-being, descriptive statistics, and test of 
difference between the treatments (with a promise and the control group without a promise) 
Variable Description No promise Promise Difference 
  Mean Std dev Mean Std dev P-value  
(t/pr-test) 
Woman = 1 if subject is a woman 0.47  0.47  0.772 
Age Age in years 48.1 14.2 47.6 14.1 0.319 
No of children No. of children (< 18 years) living 
in household 
1.42 1.28 1.40 1.28 0.547 
Divorced = 1 if divorced 0.07  0.07  0.589 
Unemployed = 1 if unemployed 0.03  0.04  0.463 
University = 1 if university education (at least 
3 years) 
0.32  0.32  0.927 
Income Individual monthly income before 
taxes in SEK 
30 900 15 350 30 300 15 100 0.261 
Reported 
health 
Self-reported health status, 1= 
very poor; 5 = very good 
3.71 0.98 3.65 1.00 0.075 
Social trust Stated trust, 1 = low trust;10 = 
high trust 
6.61 2.20 6.51 2.23 0.179 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 With a Cohen's d of 0.2, 58 % of the treatment group would be above the mean of the control group, 92 % of 
the two groups would overlap, and there would be a 56 % chance that a person randomly picked from the 
treatment group would have a higher score than a person randomly picked from the control group, i.e., 0.56 is 
the probability of superiority (McGraw and Wong, 1992). 
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Social interact. 
Low 
= 1 if interact with friends/ 
relatives less than once per month 
0.10  0.11  0.417 
Social interact. 
intermediate 
= 1 if interact with friends/ 
relatives at least once per month 
0.42  0.43  0.882 
Social interact. 
High 
= 1 if interact with friends/ 
relatives at least once per week 
0.47  0.46  0.602 
 
As expected, there are no statistically significant differences among the objective variables 
between the versions with and without a promise. However, for the more subjective question 
about self-reported health status, we do find a statistically significant difference. Self-reported 
health is higher without a promise. This is in line with Jurges (2006), who found that Danish 
and Swedish respondents tend to largely overrate their health. No statistically significant 
differences between the versions with and without a promise are found for the other questions 
of a more of subjective nature, such as social trust and social interaction.  
 
5.2 Regression models 
So far we have confirmed a systematic effect on subjective well-being by asking subjects to 
promise to tell the truth. In addition, we found a statistically significant difference in self-
reported health status between the two survey versions, while for the other subjective and all 
objective questions we did not find any statistically significant differences. The next question 
is whether the differences between the two survey versions affect coefficient estimates – in 
terms of size and statistical significance – in regression models of SWB. In order to 
investigate this, we compare two regression models with the same model specification that 
only differ in whether data was collected using a survey with or without asking the 
respondents to promise to tell the truth. Since the data is ordinal, we estimate ordered probit 
models.6 The results are presented in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Ordered probit models, stated SWB as dependent variable, with and without a 
promise to tell the truth 
 No Promise Promise Difference 
 Coeff (S.E.) Coeff (S.E.) P-value Chi-2 test 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 As discussed by Ferrer-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), the empirical findings in SWB studies need not be 
sensitive to the choice between a standard OLS model and a discrete model such as an ordered probit model. 
However, in our specific case we focus on a model that from a conceptual point of view is the more appropriate 
model because measurement errors are more problematic in a discrete model framework. 
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Woman 0.156*** 
(0.053) 
0.153*** 
(0.053) 
0.971 
Age 0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.474 
No. of children 0.138*** 
(0.023) 
0.127*** 
(0.023) 
0.746 
Divorced -0.337*** 
(0.101) 
-0.589*** 
(0.104) 
0.091 
Unemployed -0.883*** 
(0.148) 
-0.499*** 
(0.147) 
0.098 
University -0.154*** 
(0.057) 
-0.108* 
(0.058) 
0.564 
Income 0.020 
(0.017) 
0.067*** 
(0.018) 
0.078 
Reported health 0.522*** 
(0.029) 
0.477*** 
(0.028) 
0.312 
Social trust 0.089*** 
(0.089) 
0.097*** 
(0.012) 
0.659 
Social interaction low -0.137 
(0.089) 
-0.380*** 
(0.088) 
0.070 
Social interaction high 0.143*** 
(0.054) 
0.152*** 
(0.055) 
0.905 
No. obs. 1659 1596  
Pseudo R2 0.097 0.094  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
	  
	  
In the model based on data from the survey without a promise, we see that most coefficients 
are statistically significant and the signs are in line with what is typically found in SWB 
studies. Stated well-being is positively correlated with being a woman, age, number of 
children, health status, and social trust, and negatively correlated with being divorced, 
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unemployed, and a low level of social interaction. The exceptions are that individual income 
does not have a statistically significant effect on SWB and that university education has a 
statistically significant negative impact on SWB. The results are largely similar in terms of 
sign and statistical significance in the model based on data with a promise to tell the truth. 
However, at a the 10 percent significance level there are four significant differences between 
the two datasets, which is evidence that a measurement bias can lead to incorrect inferences in 
the regression analysis of SWB data. The estimated negative effect of being divorced is 
greater when using the data from the survey with a promise to tell the truth. In contrast, the 
estimated negative effect of being unemployed is smaller when using the data with a promise. 
Moreover, with a promise we observe that individual income has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on subjective well-being. Note that the reported incomes and proportions of 
subjects who are divorced or unemployed do not differ between the two survey versions. 
Finally, the negative impact of having limited social interaction is only statistically significant 
in the version with a promise, and the difference between the two versions is statistically 
significant.  
In previous studies it has been found that one effect of asking people to promise to tell the 
truth is that the underlying variance decreases (see, e.g., Carlsson et al., 2013). In order to 
control for differences in variance between the treatments for SWB data, we estimate a 
heteroskedastic ordered probit model on the pooled data. We include a set of interaction terms 
for all independent variables in order to allow for a level difference between the two survey 
versions as well. The results are presented in Table A1 in the appendix. The differences 
between the two survey versions remain the same as when comparing the two models in 
Table 3, and there is no statistically significant difference in variance between the two survey 
versions. Thus, in this specific case, there is no effect on the underlying variance when asking 
subjects to promise to tell truth. 
So far we have some evidence that a measurement bias can lead to incorrect inference in 
the regression analysis of SWB data. The results are in line with the prediction of attenuation 
bias since the absolute value of the coefficients are smaller in the version without a promise 
for three of the four coefficients where we observe a statistically significant difference 
between the two survey versions. 
Finally, we investigate the relationship between the stated overall well-being and the 
stated well-being in specific domains. We do this by estimating a model with the domain-
specific well-being as independent variables. The main focus is to compare the results 
between the two survey versions with and without a promise to tell the truth. 
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Table 4: Ordered probit models, stated overall SWB as dependent variable, and well-being in 
specific domains as independent variables, with and without a promise to tell the truth 
 No Promise Promise Difference 
 Coeff (S.E.) Coeff (S.E.) P-value  
Chi-2 test 
Financial situation 0.110 
(0.016) 
0.121 
(0.015) 
0.635 
Spare time 0.122 
(0.019) 
0.159 
(0.019) 
0.264 
Work 0.154 
(0.015) 
0.151 
(0.015) 
0.895 
Social life 0.048 
(0.019) 
0.037 
(0.019) 
0.735 
Sex life 0.003 
(0.014) 
0.002 
(0.014) 
0.952 
Family life 0.119 
(0.021) 
0.127 
(0.020) 
0.823 
Relationships 0.079 
(0.019) 
0.070 
(0.018) 
0.778 
Health 0.101 
(0.015) 
0.105 
(0.014) 
0.867 
No. obs. 1178 1115  
Pseudo R2 0.229 0.233  
# All coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.   
 
Are there any significant differences in the estimated coefficients between the two regression 
models? Surprisingly, although Table 3 revealed that people significantly overstate their 
overall as well as domain-specific satisfaction with life, there are no notable differences in the 
estimated coefficients comparing the models with and without a promise. Actually, the 
implicit ranking of the domains based on the size of the coefficient estimates is exactly the 
same in the two models. More importantly, the last column in Table 4 also shows that there 
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are no statistically significant differences. Thus, the estimated correlations between domain-
specific and overall well-being are not affected by a promise to tell the truth. This is true even 
for the presumably sensitive issue sex life. 
In order to investigate whether the results to any extent depend on a potential effect on 
the underlying variance, we estimate a heteroskedastic ordered probit model as well. Results 
are presented in Table A2 in the appendix. Although the statistical significance of a few 
coefficients is affected, the overall conclusion is unaffected. Nor do we find any statistically 
significant effect on the underling variance of the promise treatment.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Social-desirability and self-image concerns are factors that might affect how subjects respond 
to survey questions, in particular value-laden questions about for example how happy you are 
or how satisfied you are with your life. We find a systematic effect on stated well-being of 
making the subjects promise to tell the truth. We find this for both overall well-being and 
subjective well-being in a number of specific domains. In general, we find that people are 
inclined to overstate their life satisfaction. The effect size for stated subjective well-being is 
certainly not large; in fact it is rather small. However, even small differences can in theory 
have important implications for the inferences we draw in our regression models. This is 
indeed what we find empirically. There are important differences in terms of coefficient sizes 
and statistical significance between the two models with and without a promise to tell the 
truth.  
One obvious objection to all methods attempting to reduce social desirability, 
hypothetical bias, and similar effects at the data collection stage is that they are prone to 
experimenter demand effects. While this is generally true, we believe that it is of less concern 
in our setting since we do not say anything in the survey about the expected direction of a 
bias, something that is often done in for example stated preference surveys on public goods. 
Thus, it is hard for the subjects to know which researcher expectations to comply with beyond 
the simple request to answer truthfully.  
To our knowledge, we are the first to test how promises to answer truthfully affect SWB 
data. Clearly, more evidence is needed to draw robust conclusions. We also see a need for 
more work in general to improve the measurement of SWB data. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Heteroskedastic ordered probit model, stated SWB as dependent variable, with and 
without a promise to tell the truth	  
 Coeff (S.E.) 
Woman 0.157*** (0.053) 
Age 0.006*** (0.002) 
No. of children 0.139*** (0.023) 
Divorced -0.335*** (0.101) 
Unemployed -0.897*** (0.148) 
University -0.154*** (0.057) 
Income 0.021 (0.017) 
Reported health 0.524*** (0.029) 
Social trust 0.089*** (0.012) 
Social interaction low -0.137 (0.089) 
Social interaction high 0.141*** (0.054) 
Promise -0.390*** (0.223) 
Woman × Promise 0.003 (0.076) 
Age × Promise 0.003 (0.003) 
No. of children × Promise -0.008 (0.032) 
Divorce × Promise -0.273* (0.148) 
Unemployed × Promise 0.387* (0.211) 
University × Promise 0.042 (0.082) 
Income × Promise 0.049* (0.025) 
Health × Promise -0.033 (0.039) 
Social trust × Promise 0.012 (0.018) 
Social interaction low × Promise -0.249* (0.128) 
Social interaction high × Promise 0.017 (0.079) 
Variance  
Promise 0.035 (0.026) 
No. obs. 1659 
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Pseudo R2 0.097 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table A2. Heteroskedastic ordered probit models, stated SWB as dependent variable, and 
well-being in specific domains as independent variables interacted with and without a promise 
to tell the truth	  
 Coeff (S.E.) 
Financial situation 0.112*** (0.015) 
Spare time 0.121*** (0.019) 
Work 0.155*** (0.015) 
Social life 0.048** (0.019) 
Sex life 0.002 (0.014) 
Family life 0.121*** (0.021) 
Relationships 0.079*** (0.019) 
Health 0.102*** (0.0145) 
Promise -0.351* (0.181) 
Financial situation × Promise 0.009 (0.021) 
Spare time × Promise 0.038 (0.027) 
Work × Promise -0.003 (0.021) 
Social-life × Promise -0.011 (0.027) 
Sex-life × Promise 0.002 (0.020) 
Family-life × Promise 0.007 (0.029) 
Relationships × Promise -0.009 (0.026) 
Health × Promise 0.003 (0.020) 
Variance  
Promise 0.008 (0.033) 
No. obs. 2293 
Pseudo R2 0.233 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
 	  
